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Summary: 
 
Cell- based regenerative therapies are presented as being able to cure the diseases of the XXI 
century, especially those coming from the degeneration of the aging human body. But their 
specific nature based on biological materials raises particular challenging issues on how 
regulation should frame biomedical innovation for society’s benefit regarding public health. 
The European Union (EU) supports the development of cell- based regenerative therapies that 
are medicinal products with a specific regulation providing their wide access to the European 
market for European patients. However, once these medicinal products have obtained a 
European marketing authorisation, they are still far away from being fully accessible to 
European patients in all EU Member States. Whereas there is much written on the EU 
regulatory system for new biotechnologies, there is no systematic legal study comparing the 
insurance provisions in two EU countries. Focusing on the situation in the United Kingdom 
and France that are based on two different healthcare systems, this paper is based on a 
comparative methodological approach. It raises the question of regulatory reimbursement 
mechanisms that determine access to innovative treatments, and their consequences for social 
protection systems in the general context of public health. After having compared the French 
and English regulations of cell- based regenerative therapy regarding pricing and 
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reimbursement, this papers analyses how England and France are addressing two main 
challenges of cell- based regenerative therapy, to take into account their long- term benefit 
through their potential curative nature and their high up front cost, towards their adoption 
within the English and French healthcare systems. It concludes that England and France have 
different general legal frameworks that are not specific to the reimbursement of cell- based 
regenerative therapy although their two current and respective trends would bring more 
convergence between the two systems while addressing the main challenges for the 
reimbursement of these therapies. Nevertheless, despite their current differences neither the 
English nor the French national healthcare systems have yet approved the reimbursement of 
cell- based regenerative therapies. The paper highlights where both systems could be learning 
from each other experiences to favour the adoption of cell- based regenerative therapies 
through the adaptation of their reimbursement methodologies. It also emphasizes the gap 
between market access and patients’ access and, it calls for research and discussions through 
reflexive agencies such as Regenerative Medicine Expert Group in the UK.  
Keywords: Regenerative therapy, pricing, reimbursement, access, England, France 
Main Text: 
I- INTRODUCTION 
Cell- based regenerative therapies are presented as being able to cure the diseases of the XXI 
century, especially those coming from the degeneration of the aging human body. 
Regenerative therapy should be considered as part of ‘regenerative medicine’. Although 
‘regenerative medicine’ has been widely defined within the UK Strategy on Regenerative 
Medicine,1 it is not a legal concept that is strictly defined and delimited at the European Union 
level. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on cell therapy medicinal products and tissue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   “For the purposes of this strategy, regenerative medicine has been defined as an interdisciplinary approach 
spanning tissue engineering, developmental and stem cell biology, gene therapy, cellular therapeutics, 
biomaterials (scaffolds and matrices), nanoscience, bioengineering and chemical biology that seeks to repair or 
replace damaged or diseased human cells or tissues to restore normal function”. UK Councils (BBSRC, EPSRC, 
ESRC, MRC) and TSB, A Strategy for UK Regenerative Medicine, March 2012, p2. 
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engineered products under the term ‘cell- based regenerative therapies’, that are part of 
regenerative therapy, i. e. the use of human cells and tissues that are transformed into 
medicinal products for therapeutic purposes. Although the exceptional nature of regenerative 
medicine can be discussed,2 from a legal point of view cell- based regenerative therapy has 
been specifically regulated both for economic and public health objectives. Cell- based 
regenerative therapy has been foreseen as a factor of economic growth. This market is 
perceived lucrative as it could foster the competitiveness of European biotechnology 
companies and be a key to national prosperity. In addition cell- based regenerative therapy 
would offer new therapeutic perspectives in curing causes more than treating symptoms of the 
diseases only; its claimed value being long term benefits from a single or very limited number 
of treatment. A wide range of diseases could be covered, notably those for which no or 
insufficient treatments exists, such as neurological, cardiovascular, orthopaedic diseases or 
cancers. Public health regulation is consequently a combination of a will to provide a wide 
accessibility of medicine to patients while minimising the risks of these novel and complex 
therapies that rely on technical specificities of processes and products. The regulation 
currently covers the entire life- cycle of cell-based regenerative therapies from tissues and 
cells procurement to the pharmacovigilance of the authorised medicinal products, going 
through manufacturing, clinical trials, marketing authorisation, pricing, reimbursement, 
information and advertisement and even patentability. However, such regulation is quite 
complicated especially as it is based on different laws. At the European Union level, a specific 
regulation on Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products has been adopted in 2007 with the main 
objectives of providing the free movement of cell- based regenerative therapies within the 
European Union market while ensuring a high level of protection of public health.3 But such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 J Gardner, A Faulkner, A Mahalatchimy, A Webster, ‘Are there specific translational challenges in 
regenerative medicine? Lessons from other fields' (2015) 10(7) Regenerative Medicine, 885- 895. 
3 Regulation (EC) n°1394/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on advanced therapy medicinal 
products and amending Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) n°726/2004 [2007] OJ L324/121.. 
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specific European regulation to promote cell- based regenerative therapy to access the market 
does not imply ipso facto the patients’ access to the authorised medicinal products. Indeed, 
the concrete adoption of these products within the health care systems depends on national 
decisions and regulations in accordance with the EU treaties. One can consider that an 
authorised medicinal product is fully accessible to patients when it is both effectively 
commercialised in a country and when its cost is entirely covered by the national health 
insurance system. The two countries that will be compared are the UK that has a particular 
national strategy on regenerative medicine, and France that does not. The UK national 
strategy notably gives rise to the setting- up of a Regenerative Medicine Expert Group 
(RMEG) that provided an extensive report on this topic, including on the adoption of 
regenerative medicine in the clinic.4 Even though both countries are Member States of the 
European Union, which means that they are legally embedded within the EU regulatory 
promotion of cell- based regenerative therapy to access the market, the UK has a Beveridge 
model while France has a Bismarck model.5 In the UK, the system is mainly public and 
centralised. The State power ensures the financing of the system through taxes and not 
through social contributions as in France. Except in specific cases, the patients do not directly 
pay but have to be cared by public health care providers (the National Health Service- NHS) 
or by providers having an agreement with the NHS to benefit from free health care. In this 
paper, I will focus on England because reimbursement of drugs relies on different national 
authorities in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In France, the system is based on 
mandatory health insurance regimes funded by the collection of social contributions. The 
(total or partial) reimbursement of health care is provided whoever the health care provider is, 
being either public or private. While it can be considered that there is an increasing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Regenerative Medicine Expert Group, Building on our own potential: a UK pathway for regenerative medicine, 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2015. 
5 For a recent and general International review, see notably: R Kulesher, E Forrestal, ‘International models of 
health systems financing’ (2014) 3(4) Journal of Hospital Administration, 127- 139. 
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convergence between these two models that can be complementary,6 the aim of this paper is 
not to discuss their main differences as such as they have already been widely commented on, 
but rather to consider the different pathways that are relevant to cell- based regenerative 
medicine in both of them and that are not linked to the choice of different healthcare system 
models: On the basis of a comparative approach, how do English and French laws allow the 
adoption of centrally authorised (European level) cell- based regenerative therapies within 
their national healthcare systems? As a matter of fact, among the four cell- based regenerative 
therapies that have obtained a centralised marketing authorisation (ChondroCelect, MACI, 
Provenge, Holoclar),7 granted by the European Commission after positive opinion of the 
European Medicines Agency (EMA) involving the Committee for Advanced Therapies 
(CAT), none of them is covered by the UK or French national health insurance systems yet. 
Particularly, even though ChondroCelect has been the first cell- based regenerative therapy 
that obtained a European marketing authorisation in 2009, renewed in 2014, it is not presently 
reimbursed in the UK or France by public national insurances. Hence, one can wonder 
whether the current regulatory frameworks are adapted to the particular challenges raised by 
the reimbursement of regenerative medicine: mainly a balance has to be found between their 
high up front cost8 and their potential impact on public health if they attain their curing 
potential in a context of uncertainty with evidences and limited health resources. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 J Kutzin, Coordinator at WHO, Bismarck vs. Beveridge: is there increasing convergence between health 
financing systems, 1st annual meeting of SBO network on health expenditure, 21- 22 November 2011, Paris, 
OECD. 
7 Although Glybera is another ATMP that has obtained a centralized marketing authorization, it is excluded from 
the scope of this paper as it was classified as a gene therapy medicinal product by the Committee for Advanced 
Therapies at the EMA. 
8 It exists a huge variety of prices according to the drug and the country considered but the cost of regenerative 
medicine is usually perceived as high (50, 000 to 100, 000 american dollards) or very high (500, 000 to 1 million 
american dollards). To see notably: DW Freeman, Dendreon’s $93,000 prostate cancer drug: is Provenge worth 
it?, CBS News, 31 March 2011: <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/dendreons-93000-prostate-cancer-drug-is-
provenge-worth-it/>; B Hirschler, Analysis: Entering the age of the $1 million medicine, Reuters, 3 January 
2013:<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/03/us-rarediseases-idUSBRE9020C120130103>; C. Mason, DA 
Brindley, EJ Culme-Seymour, NL Davie, ‘Cell therapy industry: billion dollar global business with unlimited 
potential’ (2011) 6(3) Regenerative Medicine, 265- 272. 
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After having compared the French and English regulations of cell- based regenerative therapy 
regarding pricing and reimbursement (II), I will analyse how England and France are 
addressing the two main reimbursement challenges towards the adoption of cell- based 
regenerative therapy within the English and French healthcare systems (III).  
II- PRICING AND REIMBURSEMENT OF CELL- BASED REGENERATIVE THERAPY 
IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE 
We will first consider the main principles for reimbursement and pricing in both countries (A) 
before focusing on the specific regulatory pathways that can be used for cell-based 
regenerative therapies (B). But, first of all it should be highlighted that the European directive 
89/105/CEE relating to the transparency of measures regulating the prices of medicinal 
products for human use and their inclusion in the scope of public health insurance system 
notably requires Member States to adopt their decision on reimbursement and to communicate 
it to the applicant within 180 days of an application submitted after the granting of the 
marketing authorisation.9 
A. Main principles for reimbursement and pricing 
Both in England and France, separate rules for reimbursement (1) and pricing exist (2). 
1. Reimbursement 
In England, most licensed drugs that are prescribed in general practice, are automatically 
reimbursed except if they are integrated in one of the two negative lists based on the 
evaluations of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)10: the black list 
includes medicinal products that cannot be prescribed within the NHS, and the grey list 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Article 2 of Council Directive 89/105/EEC of 21 December 1988 relating to the transparency of measures 
regulating the prices of medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the scope of national health 
insurance systems [1989] OJ L40/p8. 
10 NICE was established in 1999. 
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includes medicinal products that can be prescribed by doctors within the NHS only for 
specific patients’ groups and indications.11 However, cell- based regenerative therapy 
generally involves surgical procedures (this is the case for ChondroCelect, MACI and 
Holoclar) or request particular conditions (an environment where resuscitation equipment is 
available must be ensured for the administration of Provenge; Holoclar and ChondroCelect 
are restricted to hospital use only). Consequently, these medicinal products should be 
administered in hospitals. But the black and grey lists that are provided for general practice do 
not apply to hospital doctors. Indeed, the latter are governed by their terms of employment 
with the hospital. Three main actors can be involved in the economics evaluation of cell- 
based regenerative therapies that will constitute the basis for decisions on reimbursement: the 
National Institute for Health Research Horizon Scanning Research & Intelligence Centre 
(NIHR HSRIC), NICE, and the NHS commissioning structures. The NIHR HSRIC, funded by 
the National Institute for Health Research, aims  
to supply timely information to key policy- and decision-makers and research funders 
within the English National Health Service (NHS) about emerging health technologies 
that may have a significant impact on patients or the provision of health services in the 
near future.12  
From 2008, this centre assessed regenerative medicine based technologies, notably 
ChondroCelect,13 but its activity on this topic enhanced from 2010.14 The NIHR HSRIC, 
located at Birmingham University, notifies NICE (normally 20 months before marketing 
authorisation for new drugs and 15 months before for new indications) on new and emerging 
health technologies that should be assessed by NICE.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 National Health Service (General Medical Services Contracts) (Prescription Drugs) regulations 2004.  
12 NIHR HSRIC <http://www.hsric.nihr.ac.uk/about-us/>. 
13 NIHR, National Horizon Scanning Centre, ChondroCelect for knee cartilage defects, August 2008. 
14 Several reports have been published on this topic in the fields of ophtalmology (2012), neurological conditions 
(2012), musculoskeletal disorders (2013), cardiac diseases (2013), skin disease, burns and wound care (2014). 
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NICE is notably in charge of the evaluation of new drugs that will be available and 
reimbursed within the NHS.15 However, such evaluation by NICE is not automatic. Indeed, 
there is a topic selection by NICE and Department of Health (DoH) based on the NIHR 
HSRIC opinions, a Department of Health request, and Manufacturers’ applications. NICE’s 
evaluation at national level is generally requested for new drugs with high price or with 
uncertain efficacy, two aspects that are generally shared by most of cell- based regenerative 
therapies. NICE’s assessment is based on available evidences, and notably on the 
cost/effectiveness balance which includes the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) analysis. 
This takes into account the impact of the treatment on the longevity and quality of life. It is 
linked to a threshold from £ 20.000 to £ 30. 000. It implies that if the NHS accepts to pay a 
new treatment, it will not pay another activity in that therapeutic area if it has a fixed budget. 
If a new drug has a cost-per-QALY of 20.000£, then the QALYs gained by 
implementing the new drug will be approximately equal to the QALYs displaced 
elsewhere in the NHS ie there will be no net health benefit from using the new drug. If 
a new drug has a cost-per-QALY of less than 20.000£, then the QALYs gained by 
implementing the new drug will exceed the QALYs displaced elsewhere in the NHS ie 
a positive net health benefit arises from using the new drug.16  
Although the QALY and this threshold have been widely criticized,17 from January 2002, the 
NHS is legally bound to reimburse treatments that are recommended by NICE in the context 
of the technology appraisal procedure. However, guidance provided by NICE in the context of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 NICE is also responsible for “producing evidence based guidance and advice for health, public health and 
social care practitioners, developing quality standards and performance metrics for those providing and 
commissioning health, public health and social care services, providing a range of informational services for 
commissioners, practitioners and managers across the spectrum of health and social care”. NICE website 
<http://www.nice.org.uk/about/what-we-do>. 
16 D Epstein, ‘Value based pricing of new pharmaceuticals in the United Kingdom National Health Service’ 
(2014) < http://www.ugr.es/~davidepstein/notesVBP2.pdf>. 
17 M Drummond, ‘What are the HTA processes in the UK?’, The NHS and HTA, What is…? Series (2009) 
<http://www.medicine.ox.ac.uk/bandolier/painres/download/whatis/What_are_HTA_proc.pdf>. 
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other evaluation procedures are not legally binding for the NHS.18 Moreover, it should be 
noted even though there is a negative mandatory evaluation by NICE, manufacturers can 
sometimes negotiate a specific agreement with the government: reimbursement of a treatment 
in the context of its being research only, shared risks by linking price to drugs’ performance, 
or financial agreement to control budget impact.19 Manufacturers can also propose a Patient 
Access Scheme (PAS), i. e. a lower price or a dose upper limit. If such a scheme is agreed 
between the company and the DoH (with the involvement of the Patient Access Scheme 
Liaison Unit (PASLU) at NICE), the treatment will be re- assessed by NICE on the basis of 
this new price to ensure that its cost per QALY will be under the acceptable threshold.20  
Without NICE formal binding assessment, i.e. without any evaluation by NICE or where 
NICE only provides non-binding recommendations, decisions will be taken by NHS 
commissioning structures. NHS England will take decision at national level for specialised 
services. The latter are those provided in relatively few specialist hospitals and accessed by a 
small number of patients. Such concentration of services aims to ensure an easier recruitment 
and training of specialist staff while providing the best use of human (staff expertise) and 
material (high tech equipment) resources21. Otherwise, in accordance with the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012, decisions are delegated to local clinical commissioning groups that 
have discretion in this matter. 
In France, the reimbursement of a medicinal product relies on the principle of the inscription 
on a positive list. In French law, a distinction is made between the ambulatory pathway, i.e. 
medicinal products are accessible from pharmacies in the cities, and the hospital pathway, i.e. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 L Nguyen- Kim, Z Or, V Paris, C. Sermet, ‘The politics of drug reimbursement in England, France and 
Germany’ (2005) 99 Issues in Health Economics 1, 5. 
19 D Epstein, Value based pricing of new pharmaceuticals in the United Kingdom National Health Service, op. 
cit. p4. 
20 Ibid. p5. 
21	  NHS England, Manual for prescribed specialised services 2013/14, January 2014, p8.	  
10	  
	  
medicinal products are accessible in health establishments22 via what is called “pharmacies 
for internal use” (“Pharmacies à usage intérieur”)23. As mentioned above, the technicity of 
cell- based regenerative therapy generally implies they should be administered in hospitals. I 
will consequently focus on the hospital pathway. 
The French law provides that only the medicinal products that are registered on the list of 
medicinal products that are authorised for use in regional authorities and diverse public 
services can be used in hospitals.24 The registration of a medicinal product on this list is 
decided by legal order of the Health and French “social health insurance” Ministers. As long 
as a medicinal product is registered on this list it can be bought by health establishments and it 
will be reimbursed by the French social health insurance system. However, the drugs’ 
registration on this list does not ensure its supply by every local health establishments. Indeed, 
each one of them will decide to supply registered medicinal products or not. 
In France, the marketing authorisation holder can engage an application with the High 
Authority for Health (Haute Autorité de Santé- HAS) to request the registration of its 
medicinal product on the list of medicinal products that are authorised for use in regional 
authorities and diverse public services, i. e. in hospitals. 
Thus, regarding drugs’ reimbursement, England and France are generally different: the former 
excludes the hospital pathway from its system of negative lists (black and grey lists) and the 
drugs’ evaluations are made either at the national level (by NICE, or by NHS England for 
specialised services) or at the local levels by local clinical commissioning groups whereas the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Articles L6111-1 and following of the French Public Health Code provide the missions of the health 
establishments whatever their public or private statute. They have to ensure the diagnostic, control, and 
treatments of patients; to provide healthcare; to participate to the coordination of care with the healthcare 
professionals from the cities; to participate to the implementation of the health policy and vigilance systems for 
health safety; to have an ethical thinking on the medical care; to create and implement a policy to improve 
continuously the quality and safety of care and risk management to prevent and treat adverse effects linked to 
their activities; to struggle adverse effects notably; to define a policy for medicinal product and medical devices. 
23 M Aulois-Griot, F Taboulet, Etablissements de santé, structures de tutelle et pharmacies à usage intérieur (4th 
edn Wolters- Kluwer, Paris 2013) 453-466. 
24 Article L5123-2 of the French Public Health Code. 
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latter bases its system on positive lists for the hospital pathway and the drugs’ evaluation are 
made both at the national (by the High Authority for Health- HAS) and local levels. 
2. Pricing 
In the UK, two regulatory schemes co-exist for drugs’ pricing. First, companies can choose to 
join the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS). The PPRS agreements are signed 
every five years between the industry, represented by the Association of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), and the DoH for the supply of branded drugs to the NHS for 
England as well as for the devolved countries. The current 2014 PPRS has been implemented 
from 1 January 2014 and will terminate on 31 December 2018.25 On the one hand, industrials 
freely set drugs’ prices. On the other hand, they accept an ex post control of their profits and a 
global negotiation on prices. More specifically, the PPRS sets a maximal profit threshold 
beyond which pharmaceutical laboratories consent to modify their prices within the range of 
considered products. They are free to choose which products will be submitted to a price 
diminution as long as the global objective of price reduction established by the PPRS is 
respected. However, such a system has been criticized as it could incite industrials to set high 
prices to anticipate forthcoming diminution. Moreover, it would not sufficiently take into 
account the clinical effectiveness of drugs.26 Second, where a company decides not to join the 
2014 PPRS, it automatically falls under the Statutory Scheme that imposes a list price cut of 
15% on products.27 
While under the 2014 PPRS, the UK national competent authorities do not directly control 
prices but rather control profit, it is the contrary under the Statutory Scheme.28 Although 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Department of Health and Association for British Pharmaceutical Industry, the Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme 2014, December 2013. 
26 Premier Ministre de la République française, Commissariat à la stratégie et à la prospective, ‘La note 
d’analyse : les médicaments et leurs prix : comment les prix sont-ils déterminés ?’ 10 (2014), 5	  
<http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/sites/strategie.gouv.fr/files/archives/2014-03-04-Prixdumedicaments-NA101.pdf>. 
27 The Health Service Medicines (Control of Prices and Supply of Information) (Amendment) Regulations 2013, 
Statutory Instrument No 2881. 
28 ABPI, Understanding the 2014 Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (2014) <http://www.abpi.org.uk/our-
work/policy-parliamentary/Documents/understanding_pprs2014.pdf>. 
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companies can choose to be covered by the Statutory Scheme, most of them choose to join the 
PPRS. Cell- based regenerative therapies are not specifically considered in the 2014 PPRS 
yet. However, they may benefit from flexible pricing that  
allows a company to propose an initial price for a technology that reflects value that 
can be demonstrated at launch, while retaining the freedom to apply to increase or 
decrease this original list price either as further evidence or as new indications emerge 
and change the effective value that the technology offers to NHS patients.29  
It may be relevant in two circumstances according to the 2014 PPRS: significant new 
evidence that changes the value of an existing indication is generated and a significant new 
indication is proposed30. 
In France, regarding pricing of drugs registered on the list of medicinal products that are 
authorised for use in regional authorities, the general regime is based on prices that are freely 
established by pharmaceutical companies and arranged with hospitals. However, drugs can be 
registered on a list of medicinal products that can be charged in sus than hospital services. In 
that case, those drugs prescribed to patients in hospitals are reimbursed on the basis of the so-
called “responsibility tariff”, i. e. an upper limit price agreed between the enterprise and the 
health products economic Comity (“Comité économique des Produits de Santé”- CEPS).31 
This list called “in sus list”, established by ministerial order,32 has been set up to avoid 
discordance and patients selection risks that could appear with the use of very expensive 
health products and to favour the spread of innovative medical technologies. Indeed, very 
expensive products would be factors of statistic heterogeneity in costs distribution: very high 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 NICE, ‘Guide to the processes of technology appraisal’, Process and methods guides (2014), 74. 
30 Ibid. pp80- 81. 
31 Where there is no agreement in a 180 days delay, the responsibility tariff is set up by the health products 
economic Comity. Nevertheless the concerned ministers (health, social health insurance and economics) can 
oppose to the decision of the health products economic Comity, and set this tariff. Article 162- 16- 6 of the 
French social health insurance code. 
32 This list is regularly updated and includes around a hundred of products. 
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cost of the product in comparison with the tariff of the concerned “diagnosis related group”33, 
or product supposed to be for a limited number of patients. Thus, it will be particularly 
relevant for cell- based regenerative therapies to come under such list. In that case, while 
pharmaceutical companies are free to set up the price of their drugs, the arrangements with 
hospitals on such prices are widely influenced by this “responsibility tariff”, which is the basis 
for the reimbursement by the national health insurance. Indeed, if a health establishment buys 
a drug that is on this list in sus for a price superior or equal to the responsibility tariff, the 
national health insurance will not reimburse more than the responsibility tariff. The surplus 
will be charged to the health establishment and not to the patient.34 Nevertheless, if a health 
establishment buys a drug that is on this list in sus for a price inferior to the responsibility 
tariff, the basis for reimbursement by the national health insurance will include 50% of the 
difference between the purchase price and the responsibility tariff in addition to the purchase 
price of the medicinal product.35 It permits a profit- sharing of the health establishment where 
it diminishes its expenses.  
Thus, in France as in the United Kingdom (except under the Statutory Scheme), prices are 
freely set by companies and indirectly controlled by national authorities. Interestingly, even 
though France does not have a national strategy on regenerative medicine, it has a specific 
procedure for the pricing of innovative medical technologies and very expensive drugs, that 
would include cell- based regenerative therapies, with the in sus list. In such a general 
context, it is relevant to consider the regulatory pathways in which cell- based regenerative 
therapies are embedded for reimbursement. 
B. Regulatory pathways for reimbursement of cell- based regenerative therapy in 
England and France 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The diagnosis- related group (“Groupe homogène de séjour”) is a basis for the main mode of financing of 
public and private health establishments. 
34 Article 162- 16- 6 of the French social health insurance code. 
35 Article 1, Legal Order of 9 May 2005 implementing part II of article L162-16-6 of the French social health 
insurance code, French OJ n°121 of 26 May 2005, page 9102, text n° 15. 
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Both in England and in France decisions on the reimbursement of cell- based regenerative 
therapy can be taken at the national (1) and/or at the local and mixed levels (2). 
1. At the national levels 
Decisions on reimbursement of cell- based regenerative therapy rely on two main national 
regulatory agencies, respectively NICE in England and HAS in France. However, whereas 
multiple regulatory pathways can be relevant for cell- based regenerative therapy at NICE (a), 
only one exists at HAS (b). 
a. Multiple Regulatory Pathways at NICE in England 
Within NICE, two assessment procedures that result in binding obligations for NHS 
commissioning can be applied to innovative products, including cell- based regenerative 
therapies.  
Firstly, Health Technology Assessment (HTA)36 (or Health Technology appraisal)37 is used 
for larger target populations. Such assessment can be either single (‘single technology 
appraisal’) when it covers only one technology for one indication, or multiple (‘multiple 
technology appraisal’) when it covers more than one technology or one technology for more 
than one indication. The NIHR HSRIC, individual healthcare professionals, NHS 
commissioners, DoH policy teams and manufacturers can contact NICE to suggest it assesses 
new health technologies through the HTA procedures.38 But final decisions on which topics 
are referred to NICE for appraisal, are made by Ministers at the DoH.39 The selection of 
technologies that will be assessed by NICE relies on selection,40 elimination41 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The word ‘technology’ is used because this procedure can be applied to medicinal products, medical devices, 
diagnostic technics, surgery procedures, and health promotion activities. 
37 Although the literature generally refers to ‘Health Technology Assessment’, NICE’s wording is ‘Technology 
appraisal’. 
38 NICE, ‘Guide to the methods of technology appraisal’ (2013) § 1. 2. 3. 
39 Ibid. 
40 The technology is likely to result in significant health benefit and impact on other health- related Government 
policies (i. e. reduction in health inequalities). NICE guidance is likely to add value as in its absence there could 
be uncertainty over clinical and cost effectiveness and variation in the use of the technology across the country. 
41 Are excluded: unlicensed technologies with no plan for licensing, modification to an existing formulation or 
technology, population screening, vaccination, HIV technology/therapy, technologies that are covered in existing 
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prioritisation (targeted population, disease severity, resource impact, and claimed therapeutic 
benefit over available NHS treatments)42 criteria to filter topics and technologies that will be 
effectively assessed by NICE.43 These evaluations are based on the analysis of clinical and 
economic evidences. NICE’s methodology on health technology appraisal44 has been recently 
completed by addendum based on a public consultation,45 following the strengthening of the 
‘value’ concept of new technologies.  
Secondly, the Highly Specialised Technologies Evaluation (HSTE) is more appropriate for 
therapies for rare diseases. This procedure can be relevant for cell- based regenerative 
therapies that may obtain the orphan designation if the criteria are fulfilled as it has been for 
Holoclar on 7 November 2008. The implementation of this procedure relies on the following 
assessment criteria:  
The target patient group for the technology in its licensed indication is so small that 
treatment will usually be concentrated in very few centres in the NHS (Originally 
defined as no more than 500 patients per annum); Highly unlikely there is a clinically 
meaningful alternative; The condition is chronic and severely disabling; The 
technology is likely to have a very high acquisition cost; The technology has the 
potential for life long use; The target patient group is distinct for clinical reasons (e.g. 
not for genetic reasons alone); The technology is expected to be used exclusively in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
guidance, technologies for which there is a lack of evidence, technologies which are not closed to be launched in 
timing, technologies that do not address key clinical questions. NICE, ‘Technology appraisals topic selection’ 
(2013). 
42 The prioritisation criteria rely on the following questions: “is the technology likely to result in a significant 
health benefit, taken across the NHS as a whole, if given to all patients for whom it is indicated? Is the 
technology likely to result in a significant impact on other health-related Government policies (for example, 
reduction in health inequalities)? Is the technology likely to have a significant impact on NHS resources 
(financial or other) if given to all patients for whom it is indicated? Is there significant inappropriate variation in 
the use of the technology across the country? Is the Institute likely to be able to add value by issuing national 
guidance? For example, in the absence of such guidance is there likely to be significant controversy over the 
interpretation or significance of the available evidence on clinical and cost effectiveness?” NICE, ‘Guide to the 
process of technology appraisal’, (2014) 2) Selection of technologies; and NICE, Centre for Health Technology 
Evaluation, ‘Updated prioritization criteria for referral of technology appraisal topics to NICE’ (2010). 
43 NICE, ‘Guide to the process of technology appraisal’ (2014). 
44 NICE, ‘Guide to the methods of technology appraisal’ (2013). 
45 There was a public consultation on this topic, opened from 27 March 2014 to 20 June 2014. NICE, ‘Methods 
of technology appraisal consultation 2014’. 
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the context of a highly specialised service; The need for national commissioning is 
significant; Available data should permit undertaking of assessment.46 
Moreover, another discretionary procedure that relies on NICE’s recommendations could be 
relevant for the evaluation of cell- based regenerative therapies. Although NICE’s 
recommendations are not mandatory regarding the reimbursement within the NHS, they can 
support decisions of NHS commissions. The so-called ‘Interventional procedure’ aims to 
assess the safety and efficacy of new47 interventional procedures.48 It does not take into 
account the cost or cost/effectiveness. This procedure results in NICE’s recommendations 
according to the following four main types: ‘normal arrangements’,49 ‘special 
arrangements’,50 ‘research only’,51 or ‘should not be used’52 regarding the technology 
assessed.53 It should be noted that another procedure covers ‘CE’ medical devices that are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 P Kefalas, ‘Market access considerations for the cell therapy industry’ (Cell Therapy Catapult, London, UK, 
March 2014) 
<https://ct.catapult.org.uk/documents/10588/12779/UK+market+access+considerations+for+the+cell+therapy+i
ndustry.pdf> accessed 18 February 2016; NICE, Interim process and methods of the highly specialised 
technologies programme, May 2013. 
47 “An interventional procedure should be considered new if it is not in regular use and a clinician, no longer in a 
training post, is using it for the first time in their […] clinical practice. Whilst the Programme is concerned 
largely with new procedures, it may also assess established procedures if there is a concern about their safety 
and/or efficacy”. Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE)- Interventional Procedures Programme, 4 March 2014, Circular HSC (SQSD) 4/14, p2. 
48 “Interventional procedures are those used for diagnosis or treatment that involve incision, puncture, entry into 
a body cavity or the use of ionising, electromagnetic or acoustic energy”. NHS, NICE, Interventional Procedures 
Programme, Process Guide, January 2009, p5. 
49 Evidences should be valid, relevant and of good quality; available in sufficient quantities for the Committee to 
make a positive decision; sufficiently consistent in nature; demonstrate benefits with an appropriate time of the 
procedure; it should also be demonstrated that the frequency and severity of adverse effects of the procedure are 
similar to, or less than, those of any comparable and established procedures”. NICE, Interventional Procedures 
Programme, Methods Guide, June 2007, p29. 
50 Where the conditions of ‘normal arrangements’ cannot be fulfilled, “recommendations are made for clinicians 
to use the procedure only with special arrangements for consent and/or audit and/or research. It is also stipulated 
that the clinical governance leads of trusts should be notified. This recommendation is often made when the 
procedure is considered to be emerging practice in the NHS”. NICE, Interventional Procedures Programme, 
Methods Guide, June 2007, p30. 
51 This procedure “should be carried out only in the context of formal research studies approved by a research 
ethics committee”. Ibid. 
52 This procedure ‘should not be used’ as “the evidence suggests that it has no efficacy and/or poses unacceptable 
safety risks”. Ibid. 
53 NICE, Interventional Procedures Programme, Methods Guide, June 2007, p29- 30. 
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excluded from the scope of this article that focuses on medicinal products: the Medical 
technologies Guidance (MTEP).54 
Finally, it should be recalled that without NICE formal assessment, decisions on 
reimbursement could be taken at national level by NHS England for specialised services 
commissioning. Indeed, NHS Specialised Services are managed by a national body, the NHS 
Commissioning Board, for commissioning services that relate to a small number of patients 
(usually less than 500 per year) in few UK hospitals.55 However, as in practice, 10 Specialised 
Commissioning Groups commission specialised services typically provided in a very limited 
number of regions,56 the tricky sharing between the NHS commissioning structures will be 
considered below at the local and ‘mixed’ level. 
Whereas three regulatory pathways could be relevant for cell- based regenerative therapy at 
NICE, there is only one at the HAS in France. 
b. One single regulatory pathway at the High Authority for Health in France 
Within the HAS, which is an independent administrative authority, a specific commission 
called “the Transparency Commission” 57 is in charge of giving opinions on the basis of which 
the registration on the list of medicinal products that are authorised for use in regional 
authorities and diverse public services will be decided.58  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 NHS, NICE, Medical Technologies Evaluation Programme, Process guide and Methods guide, April 2011. 
55 The NHS Commissioning Board was established on 1st April 2013. NHS Commissioning Board, Specialised 
services commissioning transition team, Securing equity and excellence in commissioning specialized services, 
November 2012; and NHS England News, New national model to tackle variation in specialist healthcare 
services, 21 November 2012 <https://www.england.nhs.uk/2012/11/spec-services/> accessed 18 February 2016. 
56 NHS England News, NHS England launches major exercise to shape the future of specialised services, 6 
November 2013. 
57 The Transparency Commission is composed of 20 permanent members (one president and one vice- president 
appointed by the Health and Social Health Insurance Ministers and 17 members are appointed for their scientific 
competences), 6 alternates with a deliberative vote, and 8 members with consultative vote (The general director 
for Health, the general director for the social health insurance, the general director of the General Direction for 
the offer of care, the general director of the French Agency for medicinal products, 3 persons representing the 
pharmaceutical industry (LEEM). Article R163- 15 of the French social health insurance code. 
58 It should be noted that another commission is in charge of the evaluation of medical devices and health 
technologies that are not legally considered as medicinal products for their reimbursement: “National 
Commission for the evaluation of medical devices and health technologies”. 
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For the registration on this list, rules and procedures are provided by the French Code of 
social health insurance. First, the Transparency Commission assessed the medical benefit 
(“Service Médical Rendu”- SMR) of each therapeutic indication of a medicinal product. This 
therapeutic indicator relies on the evaluation of five parameters: the efficacy and adverse 
effects of the drug, its place in the therapeutic strategy (i. e. its positioning compare to other 
therapeutic alternatives), the severity of the disease, the preventive, curative or the 
symptomatic character of the treatment, and the impact on public health (i. e. the impact of the 
drug on the population’s health regarding mortality, morbidity and quality of life; the impact 
on healthcare organisation and on the public health policy; and the ability of the drug to 
answer to a public health need not covered).59 The analysis of these parameters permits to 
grade the medicinal product according to a medical benefit scale of 5 possible grades: from 
insufficient (= no registration on the list and no reimbursement), then poor to important 
(eligible for price negotiation). Then the Transparency Commission assesses the 
“Improvement of medical benefit” or “Therapeutic added value” (“Amélioration du Service 
Médical Rendu”- ASMR) to determine the significance of the therapeutic progress provided 
by the drug in comparison with other health products of the same therapeutic class. The 
improvement of medical benefit is graded from I to V with a positive opinion for the 
registration on the list: I for the major therapeutic progress, II for a significant improvement 
regarding the therapeutic efficacy and/or the diminution of adverse effects, III for a modest 
improvement regarding the therapeutic efficacy and/or the diminution of adverse effects, IV 
for a minor improvement regarding the therapeutic efficacy and/or the clinical utility, and V 
for no improvement.60 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Article R163-3 of the French social health insurance code. 
60 Article R163-5 of the French social health insurance code. 
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This medico-administrative or medico- technical evaluation61 by the Transparency 
Commission ends up with the publication of an opinion from this Commission, the so- called 
“Transparency opinion”, accessible online on the HAS’s website. It includes multiple 
information regarding the medicinal product especially the medical benefit and the 
improvement of medical benefit.62 On the basis of this opinion, the Minister of health and 
French “social health insurance” decides whether to register the medicinal product on the list 
of medicinal products that are authorised for use in regional authorities. It should be 
underlined that drugs which do not have a sufficient improvement of medical benefit and 
which do not give rise to a diminution in the cost of treatment cannot be registered on the list 
of medicinal products that can be reimbursed in the towns’ pharmacies pathway.  
Although multiple potential pathways exist at NICE for the evaluation of drugs, and a single 
regulatory pathway at the HAS which in any case is completed by local evaluations, none of 
them is specific to cell- based regenerative therapy.  
2. At the local and mixed levels 
In England, NHS Commissioning structures are “the budget holders for the health economy 
and will commission services at local, regional, or national level from a wide range of 
providers”.63 As said above, NHS legally has to fund and provide treatments recommended by 
NICE’s technology appraisal (either single or multiple under TA or under HSTE). However, 
all therapies cannot be assessed by NICE because of capacity constraints and selection criteria 
as explained above. In these cases without NICE formal assessment, NHS will decide on 
commissioning for therapies either at the national level for specialised services through the 10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The 2014 press file of the HAS uses the expressions « medico- technic criteria » and « medico- technic file » 
regarding the evaluation and the application to the Transparency Commission. French HAS, Press file, Press 
conference on 29 September 2014, [Health system regulation by quality and efficiency], p3. 
62 According to article R163- 18 of the French social health insurance code, the transparency opinion gives 
information on the legitimacy of the registration regarding the medical benefit assessed for each therapeutic 
indication, the improvement of medical benefit assessed for each therapeutic indication in the therapeutic class 
of the product regarding three comparators (drug the most sold, the most costly, and the last registered), the 
conditions for the use of the drug, the targeted population, the rate for reimbursement, the match with packaging 
63 VALUE project Final report, Regenerative Medicine: Navigating the uncertainties, March 2012, p21. 
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regional specialised commissioning groups or at the local level for other services through the 
209 clinical commissioning groups. It should also be noted that if five or more “individual 
patient request” are made by clinicians through a formal procedure for a new technology, 
NHS England has to produce a commissioning policy for it as a clinical service at one or more 
providing centres. Where therapies appear in the Manual for prescribed specialised services,64 
commissioning decisions are taken by NHS Specialised Services. For all the other therapies, 
commissioning decisions are taken by local Clinical Commissioning Groups that have 
discretion in this matter. The lack of transparency regarding the methodologies and criteria 
used to decide on reimbursement at the local level combined to the multiple responsible 
Clinical Commissioning Groups contribute to the obscurity of the system. Hence, the national 
homogeneity provided for specialised services is opposite to the huge variations occurring for 
all other services. At the moment, cell- based regenerative therapies as defined in this paper 
are not in the Manual; decisions on their reimbursement consequently falls under the remit of 
local Clinical Commissioning Groups where there is no previous mandatory NICE decision. 
They could be included in the Manual in the future by Ministerial decision following an 
opinion from a committee called the Prescribed Specialised Services Advisory Group. In such 
a context, four factors determine whether NHS England will commission a therapy as a 
specialised service: number of individuals who require provision of service (size of target 
population), cost of providing the service or facility, number of persons (clinicians/hospitals) 
able to provide the service or facility, financial implications for Clinical Commissioning 
Groups if they were required to commission the service of facility themselves.65 NHS 
Specialised Services are advised by Clinical Reference Groups and/ or by the Rare Diseases 
Advisory Group. The latter group receives recommendations from Clinical Reference Groups 
and formulate its advice on the basis of evidence from professional bodies and patient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 NHS England, Manual for Prescribed Specialised Services 2013/14, January 2014.	  
65 NHS Commissioning Board, Specialised services commissioning transition team, Securing equity and 
excellence in commissioning specialized services, November 2012, op. cit. p4. 
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groups.66 It also makes recommendations to NHS England, NHS Scotland, NHS Wales and 
NHS Northern Ireland on developing and implementing the strategy for rare diseases and 
highly specialised services.67 In such a context, NHS England set up a working group on 
regenerative medicine and the RMEG report recommended to formalise it into a Clinical 
Reference Group for regenerative medicine.68 However, the latter is not yet set up and 
unlikely to be so. Finally, it should be noted that for unlicensed therapies, commissions 
decisions should be taken on the basis of NICE ‘Evidence Summaries’69 and decentralised at 
the level of NHS local commissioners.70  
In France, at the local levels within each health establishment, the so- called medical 
Commission of establishment71 sets up, on the basis of the list of medicinal products that are 
authorised for use in regional authorities, a list of medicinal products that will be available in 
the pharmacy for internal use and that are recommended by the establishment. In 2005, a 
study by B. Juillard- Condat et al. on the Toulouse university hospital notably highlighted that 
only 43, 2 % of medicinal products referenced within the establishment had an accessible 
opinion from the Transparency Commission.72 Among them, the level of the medical benefit 
has been explicitly assessed in 98, 1% of the opinions of the Transparency Commission (93% 
has an important medical benefit) whereas the improvement of medical benefit has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 NHS England, Rare Diseases Advisory Group: terms of reference, June 2013. 
67 Ibid. 
68 RMEG, op. cit. p17. 
69 Evidence summaries are not formal NICE guidance but they “help commissioners, budget holders and groups 
such as Area Prescribing Committees make informed decisions and aid local planning on the introduction of key 
new medicines. They are quality- assured summaries of the best available evidence for selected new medicines, 
or existing medicines with new indications or a new formulation, considered to be significant to the NHS. The 
strengths and weaknesses of the relevant evidence are critically reviewed, and a value assessment of each 
medicine is made based on its safety, effectiveness, patient factors and resource implications”. NICE, Evidence 
summaries, new medicines : < http://www.nice.org.uk/about/what-we-do/our-programmes/nice-advice/evidence-
summaries-new-medicines>. 
70 J Jorgensen, P Kefalas, ‘Reimbursement of licensed cell and gene therapies across the major European 
healthcare markets’ (2015) 3 Journal of Market Access & Health Policy, 29321. 
71 This Commission was formerly called the Commission of medicinal product and sterile medical devices. The 
law n°2009-879 of 21 July 2009 reforming the hospital and relating to patients, health and territories (French OJ 
n°0167 of 22 July 2009, page 12184, text n°1) leaves the medicinal product policy to the medical Commission of 
establishment. 
72 B Juillard- Condat, MC Durand, F Taboulet, ‘SMR et ASMR : quelle utilité dans le contexte hospitalier ?’ 
(2008) 26 Journal d’Economie Médicale, 269-282.	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assessed only for 16% of the referenced medicinal products (17% had a level I or II 
improvement of medical benefit, 15% a level III, 13% a level IV, and 38% a level V). This 
study notably raised the problems related to the lack of availability of the Transparency 
Commission’s opinions and their lack of updates. But since 2005, the HAS has a permanent 
preoccupation for transparency in all its activities. Consequently, the opinions of the 
Transparency Commission are much more complete and more frequently available online on 
its website.73 
Thus, even though several pathways exist for cell- based regenerative therapies at NICE, only 
two (the TA and HSTE) result in binding obligations for NHS commissioning. It implies that 
where a cell- based regenerative therapy is submitted to another pathway at NICE, or is not 
considered at the NICE level, the decision to reimburse it or not and to supply it or not within 
the NHS can be different at the local levels as they fall under the remit of NHS 
Commissioners (as long as they are not included in the Manual of Specialised services). The 
navigation between these different pathways and different institutions is complicated and their 
borders are not always clear. However, NICE recently established an ‘Office for Market 
Access’  
to provide companies with a 'flight path' through the stages of the development, 
evaluation and adoption of their products into the NHS; agreement between NICE, 
NHS England and the Department of Health, on the NHS's willingness to pay for new 
treatments, which would take account of any special cases, such as ultra-orphan 
conditions and cancer; more productive sharing of risk between companies and the 
NHS.74  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 HAS, Open data: [the French High Authority for Health publishes new data], Press release, 10 July 2014. 
74 NICE, Press release, NICE calls for a new approach to managing the entry of drugs into the NHS, 18 
September 2014, op. cit. 
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In France, even though the criteria of medical benefit and improvement of medical benefit do 
not seem to be adapted to the local level of the hospital pathway,75 the main barriers of the 
patients’ access to authorised medicinal products come from the selection in each health 
establishment because of budget limitations which are quite obscure. Indeed, as specified 
above, after the centralised evaluation, there is always a decentralised evaluation in France.  
Finally, England and France have different general legal frameworks for reimbursement and 
none of them is specific to cell- based regenerative therapy. However, the obscurity at the 
local levels characterised the two systems. Moreover, both countries have to address the 
reimbursement challenges raised by the assessment of cell- based regenerative therapy for 
their adoption in clinics. 
III- ADDRESSING CELL- BASED REGENERATIVE THERAPY’S REIMBURSEMENT 
CHALLENGES IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
Both England and France have to address health budget limitations for aging populations. 
Growing pressures for the best use of limited resources necessitates the need to find the right 
methods to decide which treatments should be reimbursed by the national systems. Hence, the 
specificities of regenerative therapies, mainly its high up front cost and its potential curing 
effect should be considered in the assessment for decision on reimbursement. In such context, 
both countries have different trends towards the modification of their assessment for 
reimbursement, and their links to regenerative therapies (A). However, the assessments of the 
first cell- based regenerative therapy that obtained a European marketing authorisation, 
ChondroCelect for the treatment of knee cartilage provide similar outcomes in England and 
France (B).  
A. Different trends towards the assessment’s modification for reimbursement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 B Juillard- Condat et al., ‘SMR et ASMR : quelle utilité dans le contexte hospitalier ?’, op. cit. p269-282. 
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The two main challenges for the reimbursement of cell- based regenerative therapies come 
from two specificities of these products: their potential curing effect and their high up front 
cost. On the one hand, the potential curing effect implies that the long- term benefit of using 
cell- based regenerative therapies, and consequently their impact on public health widely, 
should be taken into account in the evaluations to decide on their reimbursement (1). On the 
other hand, the high up front cost implies the impact on health budgets through the choices 
among the available treatments should be taken into account in the economics evaluations for 
decisions on reimbursement (2).  
1. Strengthening the assessment of the public health value  
Thanks to the establishment of NICE, England has a long experience with the economics 
evaluation of drugs. However, the discussion’s emphasis is now on how to take into account 
the wider value of health products for public health. First, England has been recently 
reforming pricing regulation and drugs assessments to focus its system on the concept of 
‘value- based pricing’ regarding drug in general. Such reform, established by the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012, is ongoing from 2014. Value- based pricing links drugs and healthcare 
reimbursement to an evaluation based on evidences of value for patients, relatives, and the 
society.76 It relies on a wider meaning of ‘value’ that includes three elements: the wider 
economic benefit,77 the unmet need or burden of the disease,78 and the therapeutic innovation 
and improvement.79  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 J Raftery, ‘Value based pricing: can it work?’ (2003) BMJ, 347. 
77 The wider economic benefit might include impact on direct costs and benefits of care that impact on patients 
but do not fall on the NHS budget (unpaid carers time, patients out of pocket expenses, quicker return to work, 
lost leisure time in accessing care), and indirect external effects (costs and benefits) on the rest of the economy 
(productivity gains). K Claxton, M Sculpher, S Carroll, ‘Value-based pricing for pharmaceuticals: Its role, 
specification and prospects in a newly devolved NHS’ (2011) Center for Health Economics, Research paper 60, 
18- 19. 
78 This criterion relies on taking into account other aspects of social value that are not fully reflected in the 
measure of health gain used in the present NICE appraisal via QALY. “For example, QALY gains in areas 
where the burden of the disease is regarded as more severe (which might be defined in terms of current health, or 
past health experience, or the length and quality of life expected to be lost as a consequence of the condition) or 
rare (orphan drugs) might be regarded as more socially valuable and carry greater weight. This would allow 
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Whereas the value based pricing system should have been implemented in 2014, debates 
moved toward a new system of ‘value- based assessment’ (VbA). In June 2013, the 
Government requested NICE to undertake assessment based on value and did not request any 
other change. In such context, the cost/effectiveness threshold from £20 000 à £30 000 is 
maintained within the new PPRS 2014 and enterprises can always set prices of their new 
drugs although the total amount of drugs expenses is controlled.80 NICE opened a public 
consultation on VbA of health technologies.81 The VbA takes into account more specifically 
and explicitly the severity and the effects of the disease on people’s ability to be part of the 
society.82 900 comments from 121 organisations and individuals were received, and NICE 
decided that supplementary works were necessary before changing its evaluation method,83 
especially as it appears its board could not agree on the changes to be proposed. Second, 
although this general reform has turned down because of the difficulty knowing how to 
measure “value”, supplementary work on this aspect has started in the field of regenerative 
medicine specifically. Indeed, in March 2015, the RMEG report provided that applying 
NICE’s appraisal methodology,  
based on cost utility analysis, to products whose true value may not be known for 
many years can be challenging, due to the inherent uncertainty of estimating long-term 
benefit from evidence derived from short-term studies.84  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
medicines with these characteristics to be accepted with higher prices”. D Epstein, ‘Value based pricing of new 
pharmaceuticals in the United Kingdom National Health Service’, op. cit. p8. 
79 This criterion is based on the evaluation of the significant improvement brought by a new drug compare to 
existing treatments. Department of Health, A new value- based approach to the pricing of branded medicines- A 
consultation, 16 December 2010, p15. 
80 PPRS heads of agreement, 6 November 2013. D Cressey, ‘UK backs away from ‘value based pricing for 
drugs’’(2013) Nature News Blog. 
81 NICE, Centre for Health Technology Evaluation, Consultation paper, value based assessment of Health 
Technologies, 27 March 2014.  
82 Ibid. 
83 NICE, Press release, NICE calls for a new approach to managing the entry of drugs into the NHS, 18 
September 2014. 
84 RMEG, Building on our own potential: a UK pathway for regenerative medicine, op. cit. p6. 
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Thus, it endorsed NICE’s proposal “to undertake one or two ‘mock’ technology appraisal 
studies, on exemplar regenerative medicine products”85 and encourage it “to consider the 
findings from these studies with a view to assessing whether changes to its methods and 
processes are needed”.86 This project started on April 2015 for an 8 months period and 
notably aims to identify key assessments needed regarding the value of regenerative medicine 
taking into account its potential curative nature and the claims of long- term/lifetime 
benefits.87  
Both the general discussion on the value- based assessment and the mock appraisal for 
regenerative medicine can be considered as a trend towards strengthening the value of drugs 
for public health, with particular relevance for cell- based regenerative therapies. In that 
context, it may be useful for England to be learning from the French system that places the 
emphasis on the impact on public health rather than on economics evaluation. Firstly, the 
reimbursement on the basis of the responsibility tariff regarding the in sus list could be a 
procedure to be explored in England to enhance patients’ equity in the access to cell- based 
regenerative therapies while considering their high cost. However, it should be adapted as the 
French’s experience showed such incentive for the diminution of drugs’ prices might become 
obsolete if managed as in France. Indeed, in France, the price diminutions agreed by the 
pharmaceutical companies led to a diminution of the responsibility tariff set up by the CEPS 
and consequently to a loss for the companies which would have accepted to not exceed a 
responsibility tariff always lower for hospitals to buy their drugs. Secondly, England could 
learn from the French Transparency Commission’s evaluations that use criteria similar to 
those discussed in the context of the value- based pricing/assessment. Indeed, the curative 
character of the treatment, the severity of the disease and the impact on public health to assess 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Ibid. p15. 
86 Ibid. p26. 
87 CRD/CHE University of York Research Protocol, Exploring the assessment and appraisal of regenerative 
medicines and cell therapy products, 8th June 2015. 
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the “medical benefit” and the assessment of the “Improvement of the medical benefit” echo 
the wider economic benefit, the unmet need or burden of the disease and the therapeutic 
innovation and improvement. They are also particularly relevant for cell- based regenerative 
therapies regarding their potential curative nature and their long- term benefit. However, as 
the French experience shows, caution is needed. On the one hand, the assessment of the 
“improvement of medical benefit” as in France appear to be limited for the local level where 
the following criteria need to be considered: the paediatric forms, the characteristics that may 
improve the observance, the high doses, the drugs associations or forms that facilitate the 
administration or the continuity of the treatment, and the necessity for therapeutic 
alternatives.88 On the other hand, the President of the French HAS has appealed to merge the 
assessments of the “medical benefit” and the “improvement of medical benefit” to address the 
needs of comparative evaluation and criteria’s clarifications for costly therapeutic 
innovations.89 
2. Strengthening the assessment of the economics value  
Contrary to England, France has no experience with the economics evaluation of drugs. 
Indeed, in France, the Transparency Commission carries out a ‘medico- technical’ evaluation 
only, it does not take into account the economics value of drugs. The medico- economic 
evaluation is under the remit of the economic evaluation and public health Commission 
(“Commission Evaluation Economique et de Santé Publique”- CEESP).90 The latter has been 
established to provide an answer to the mission given to the HAS by the 2008 law for the 
financing of the national health insurance.91 Henceforth the HAS can publish 
recommendations and medico- economic opinions on the most efficient care, prescription or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  B Juillard- Condat et al., ‘SMR et ASMR : quelle utilité dans le contexte hospitalier ?’, op. cit. p280.	  
89 HAS, Communiqué de presse du 29 septembre 2014; HAS, Activity Report 2013, op. cit. p94. 
90 This Commission met for the first time the 1st July 2008. 
91 Article 41 of the law n° 2007-1786 of 19 December 2007 the financing of the national health insurance for 
2008, French OJ n°0296, 21 December 2007, page 20603, text n° 1. 
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reimbursement strategies. The 2008 law for the financing of the national health insurance92 
strengthened this mission making it mandatory under specific conditions. It fixes at the 
legislative level the medico- economic evaluation based on the efficiency criterion, i. e. the 
cost/efficacy balance of a drug. The Decree n°2012- 1116 regarding the medico- economic 
missions of the HAS, enforceable one year after its publication, i. e. since the 4 October 2013, 
specifies the conditions for the implementation of the medico- economic evaluation.93 This 
evaluation is undertaken when the applicant claims a health product has a major, important or 
moderate improvement of the medical benefit or improvement of the benefit (ASMR I, II or 
III) and when it can have a significant impact on the national health insurance expenses.94 
These two cumulative conditions make obligatory the medico- economic evaluation when 
there is an application for registration on the reimbursement lists or for its renewal. The HAS 
has to define and make available to the public the conditions and criteria enforceable for the 
medico- economic evaluation.95 The latter have recently been identified. As the “significant 
impact on the national health insurance expenses” criterion is vague, it has been discussed by 
the economic evaluation and public health Commission that firstly considered an easy 
decision’s rule should be proposed, with possibility for further evolution, to permit industrials 
to determine easily whether their products have to be submitted to the medico- economic 
evaluation. Criteria to be chosen should be “objective, easy and not manipulable”.96 By 
decision of 18 September 2013, the HAS has specified the procedure to determine the 
“significant impact on the national health insurance expenses”.97 The HAS examines the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Law n° 2011-1906 of 21 December 2011 on the financing of the national health insurance for 2012, French OJ 
n°0296, 22 December 2011, page 21682, text n° 1. 
93 Legal Decree n° 2012-1116 of 2 October 2012 on the medico- economic missions of the High Authority for 
Health, French OJ n°0231, 4 October 2012 page 15522, text n° 8. 
94 Article R161-71-1. - I. of the French social health insurance code. 
95 Article R161-71 4° b) of the French social health insurance code. 
96 CEESP, Meeting report, 14 May 2013, p6. 
97 HAS, Decision n°2013-0111 DC/SEESP of 18 September 2013 on the significant impact on the national 
health insurance expenses for the start of the medico- economic evaluation with a level I, II or III improvement 
of medical benefit, French Official Bulletin on Health, Social protection, and Solidarity n°2013/10, 15 
November 2013, p1. 
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industrial company’s claims regarding the impact of the product on the organisation of care, 
the professional practices or the conditions for taking charge of patients. It also takes into 
account the estimated turnover98 of this product for all its therapeutic indications.99 Where the 
industrial companies do not have specific claims, the HAS considers the medico- economic 
evaluation is requested as soon as the product’s turnover is superior or equal top 20 million 
euros per year.100 Moreover, the opinion of the CEESP on the foreseeable or observed 
efficiency for the reimbursement of the product, the so- called “efficiency opinion” is based 
on the comparative analysis of the balance between the engaged costs and the expected or 
observed benefits for the health and quality of life of the concerned persons regarding the 
different therapeutic alternative medically relevant.101 On 18 December 2014, 15 efficiency 
opinions have been adopted among the 26 (25 medicinal products and 1 medical device) 
qualified for such procedure. In accordance with the national health insurance code, the HAS 
had to define and publish the medico- economic evaluation’s methodologies adapted to the 
different preventive and care activities taking into account efficacy, quality, safety, prevention 
and care costs and organisation and their interest for public health, patients’ quality of life, the 
improvement of the equal access to prevention and care, and the respect of ethical 
principles.102 To this end, it adopted a guide on the methodological choices for the medico- 
economic evaluation by the HAS.103 It provides 20 recommendations for a reference analysis 
that takes on two methods for the economic assessment: the cost-utility analysis104 or the cost-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 [The turnover of a product is the foreseen turnover every taxes included after two years of commercialisation 
where there is a first registration or the observed turnover every taxes included in case of registration renewal]. 
Article 1 alinea 2 of the HAS’ decision n°2013-0111 DC/SEESP, Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Article 2 alinea 2 of the HAS’ decision n°2013-0111 DC/SEESP, op. cit. 
101 Article R161-71-1. - II. of the French social health insurance code. 
102 Article R161- 71 4° a) of the French social health insurance code. 
103 HAS, economic evaluation and public health Department, methodological guide- methodological choices for 
the medico- economic evaluation by the HAS, October 2011. 
104 For the cost- utility analysis, the result criterion to be preferred if the lifetime adjusted to the quality. This 
analysis is systematically conducted with a cost- efficacy analysis that relies on the lifetime without moderation 
as a result criterion. Ibid. p18. 
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efficacy105 analysis chosen according to the nature of the interventions’ effects on health.106 
Finally, it should be noted that the efficiency opinion of the CEESP are public, submitted to a 
contradictory procedure, and transferred to the health products economic Comity. Thus in 
France, the HAS, via the CEESP, is in charge of the setting up and the diffusion of 
recommendations and medico- economic opinions on the most efficient strategies for 
prevention, healthcare, medical prescription or reimbursement and to participate to their 
comparison or organisation into a hierarchy in a public health and health insurance expenses’ 
optimization objective.107 Experience is still lacking regarding this medico- economic 
evaluation that was in a pilot phase in 2013.108 However, two comments can be made 
regarding the French medico- economic evaluation and its use for regenerative therapies. 
First, it can be thought that products based on regenerative medicine will be submitted to this 
mandatory medico- economic evaluation because of their costs foreseen as high as long as 
they have a satisfying medical benefit or improvement of medical benefit (ASMR I, II or III). 
However, among the 7 efficiency opinions that have been published on the HAS’s website on 
25 August 2015, none of them is related to regenerative therapy yet. Second, the medico- 
economic evaluation is not necessarily taken into account for decision- making as long as an 
applicant’s claim of ASMR I, II or III does not imply ipso facto such ASMR I, II or III will be 
granted by the Transparency Commission.109  
Thus, two opposite trends appear. On the one hand, England, strong from its experience with 
economics assessment, is now trying to move towards a wider assessment that includes value 
for public health. On the opposite, France that was used to assess the impact of health 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 For the cost- efficacy analysis, the result criterion to be preferred is the lifetime. Ibid. 
106 The cost- utility analysis is preferred if the quality of life is a significant consequence. Otherwise the cost- 
efficacy analysis is preferred.  
107 Article R161-71 4° of the French social health insurance code. 
108 HAS, 2013 Activity Report, p20. 
109 C Rémuzat, M Toumi, B Falissard, ‘New drug regulations in France: what are the impacts on market access? 
Part 2 impacts on market access and impacts for the pharmaceutical industry’ (2013) 1 J Market Access Health 
Policy, 20892. 
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products on public health is now starting the economics assessment. These two trends are 
particularly relevant to address the challenges raised by the reimbursement of cell- based 
regenerative therapies. Both countries should be learning from each other experiences to go 
further in their respective trends. Their achievement would bring more convergence between 
the English and the French systems. Moreover, the English experience with NICE combined 
with the national strategy on regenerative medicine gives rise to specific thoughts such as the 
RMEG report, and activities such as the mock appraisal, for the thinking and the potential 
adaptation of methodologies for the decisions on cell- based regenerative therapies 
reimbursement. Such thinking is currently totally absent in France, although as the latter is 
logically working first on the setting- up and the improvement of the new general medico- 
economic evaluation. Moreover, while the Health Technology Appraisals at NICE determine 
the reimbursement and the availability in the NHS, the medico- economic evaluation in 
France is used for the negotiations on pricing by the CEPS without being directly linked to the 
decision- making on reimbursement.110 Finally, contrary to England, there is not an explicit 
interpretation rule, nor a reference threshold in France to assess the efficiency of a health 
product. It should be noted that Toumi M. et al. considers  
The French threshold exists intuitively but not as a hard value. Furthermore, it is not a 
key driver, as in the UK, but is instead modulated by a number of attributes, which not 
all are fully explicit. The French threshold ranges from £50,000 per QALY to as high as 
£300,000 per QALY for some rare conditions or oncology drugs. There is a clear 
perception that the French informal moving threshold may be outstandingly high 
compared to that of other countries.111  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Inspection Générale des Affaires Sociales, Evaluation médico- économique en santé, Décembre 2014, p3.  
111 M Toumi et al., ‘Current process and future path for health economic assessment of pharmaceuticals in 
France’ (2015) Journal of Market Access & Health Policy [S.l.] v. 3. 
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In any case, such difference regarding the explicit definition of a reference threshold 
significantly highlights the lack of literature consensus on its necessity for decision- 
makers.112 
Beyond such current differences between the two systems, the national assessments of the 
first cell- based regenerative therapy that obtained a European marketing authorization to treat 
the knee cartilage injury gave rise to similar outcomes: its non-reimbursement in France and 
England. 
B. The assessment of the treatment of knee cartilage injury: A similar outcome in 
England and France 
In England, the treatment of knee cartilage injury gave rise to two interventional procedures 
assessments that are not mandatory. In 2006, NICE considered mosaicplasty for knee 
cartilage injury had efficacy evidences for short term, but long-term efficacy data were 
inappropriate. Because of such efficacy uncertainties, NICE did not recommend mosaicplasty 
without specific measures being implemented.113 The same occurred in 2012 regarding the 
partial replacement of the meniscus of the knee using a biodegradable scaffold.114 Although 
these two decisions were discretionary as they come from interventional procedures 
assessments that are non-binding, the same position was followed by NICE within the context 
of technology appraisal that results in a mandatory decision. Indeed, the autologous 
chondrocyte implantation to treat cartilage injury was assessed by NICE in 2005, prior to the 
marketing authorisation of ChondroCelect. NICE did not recommend autologous chondrocyte 
implantation for the treatment of cartilage defects of the knee except for ongoing or new 
clinical studies “that are designed to generate robust and relevant outcome data, including the 
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littérature, décembre 2014, p30. 
113 NICE, Mosaicplasty for knee cartilage defects, March 2006, Interventional Procedure n°162. 
114 NICE, Partial replacement of the meniscus of the knee using a biodegradable scaffold, July 2012, 
Interventional Procedure n°430. 
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measurement of health- related quality of life and long- term follow- up”.115 A review of this 
appraisal is ongoing within NICE. It is a multiple technology appraisal that covers both 
ChondroCelect and MACI.116 A single technology appraisal for ChondroCelect is also 
ongoing within NICE.117 Consequently as NICE did not complete its assessment of 
ChondroCelect, the latter is not reimbursed within the NHS at the national level. However 
according to Tigenix, two Primary Care Trusts118 would have accepted to fund ChondroCelect 
for individual requests.119 In the private sector, according to Tigenix, two of the largest private 
health insurance in the UK would reimburse ChondroCelect.120 Our researches confirmed 
BUPA was one,121 but the second private insurance that would cover ChondroCelect in the 
UK has not been founded. Finally, it should be noticed that a UK private hospital, The 
Grosvenor Hospital in Chester, is proposing autologous chondrocyte implantation to its 
patients: it is offering ChondroCelect while specifying that this treatment is outside the NHS 
and NICE guidance, but that “NICE guidance does not override the responsibility of health 
professionals to make appropriate decisions on the circumstances of individual patients”.122 
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119 Tigenix, Annual report 2013, p40. 
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122. Chester Knee Clinic & Cartilage Repair Centre, Nuffield Health, The Grosvenor Hospital Chester, Tigenix 
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Furthermore, it is involved in a clinical trial aiming to compare autologous chondrocyte 
implantation with MACI.123 
In France, the Transparency Commission has examined the therapeutic interest of 
ChondroCelect. In its opinion from 6 October 2010, the following conclusions appear:  
Even though the Commission considers it is an innovative biotechnology, the medical 
benefit should be provisionally considered insufficient on the basis of the present data to 
justify a reimbursement. The Commission cannot assess its therapeutic interest, 
especially to prevent arthrosis in the long term.124  
This evaluation’s result is based on two main arguments. On the one hand, the Commission 
considered that at the date of the application for reimbursement the clinical efficacy of 
ChondroCelect was not established notably regarding the size of the effect, the impact on the 
quality of life, the preventive effect on the development of the arthrosis of the knee.125 The 
robustness of the results was considered arguable and the clinical superiority compare to the 
microfracture technic was not proved. On the other hand, a public health interest was not 
expected from ChondroCelect as long as its impact on the functional limitations and on the 
quality of life could not be established: according to the Commission, the file had no element 
on the long term prevention of arthrosis, available data came from only one study with a 
limited number of patients (112 patients among whom 51 have been treated with 
ChondroCelect and 61 by the microfracture technic), the transposable character of the results 
of the pilot trial to the practice was not ensured (numerous criteria for exclusion and necessity 
for the patients to follow a re-education program). 126 The evaluation process for the 
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125 Ibid. p16. 
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registration of the product on the list of drugs that are reimbursed by the national health 
insurance was thus stopped from this assessment. Consequently, the improvement of medical 
benefit, the indicator used in France to measure the therapeutic progress, was not even 
quantified. Thus, in accordance with the French social health insurance code, the registration 
of ChondroCelect on the list of medicinal products that are authorised for use in regional 
authorities has been refused and its use cannot be reimbursed by the national health insurance 
in France.127 Even though ChondroCelect obtained a renewal of its European marketing 
authorisation and safety and efficacy post- authorisation studies have been conducted, the 
Transparency Commission maintained its negative position regarding the registration of 
ChondroCelect on the list of medicinal products that are authorised for use in regional 
authorities in an opinion dated from 29 May 2013: after 12 months of following, it considered 
ChondroCelect has not proved a more significant clinical improvement compare to 
microfracture or mosaicplasty.128 Its medical benefit is still considered insufficient,129 and 
consequently its improvement of medical benefit has still not been assessed. Thus, it is not 
eligible to the medico- economic evaluation by the CEESP. 
Although I have chosen ChondroCelect as an example because it has been the first cell- based 
regenerative therapy to obtain a centralised marketing authorisation and because it has been 
assessed both by NICE and HAS, it should be highlighted that none of the other authorised 
cell- based regenerative therapies (MACI, Provenge, Holoclar) are currently reimbursed by 
the English and French health insurance systems. Holoclar has not been assessed for 
reimbursement yet. Reimbursement for MACI and Provenge has not been recommended by 
NICE while MACI’s authorisation has been suspended for lack of manufacturing site and 
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Provenge’s authorisation has been withdrawn at the request of the manufacturing 
authorisation holder for commercial reasons. 
IV- CONCLUSION 
The reimbursement of the first ATMP was turned down because of inadequate evidence for 
both the UK and France systems despite their differences and even though the medicinal 
product was granted a marketing authorisation via the centralised procedure. It emphasizes 
that the efficacy assessed for marketing authorisation is distinct from the ‘medical benefit’ 
that is calculated in relative cost terms for reimbursement. The current trend at the EU level is 
the promotion of early contact with both the EMA for market access and HTA bodies for 
reimbursement through parallel scientific advices. It has also been emphasized in the EMA 
pilot project on adaptive pathways launched in March 2014.130 Thus, researches and 
discussions through reflexive agencies such as RMEG in the UK as well as early contacts 
with both regulators and HTA bodies, are necessary to find solutions to fill in the gap between 
the EU promotion of regenerative medicine access to the market, through the advanced 
medicinal products legal framework, and the real access of patients to these products once 
they are authorised on the European market. These regulatory steps are two distinctive 
“gatekeeping arenas” where special treatments for regenerative medicine through exceptions 
and exemptions to the general legal frameworks are currently considered.131 However, the 
high cost of regenerative therapies will always have to be balanced with the limited national 
health resources and expenses.132 In that context, regulations that boost the promotion of 
public health, such as the current criteria of the impact on public health used by the 
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Transparency Commission in France, or the VbA’s discussions in England encourage 
pharmaceutical research into a different range of conditions. They should be embedded in a 
discussion that goes beyond cell- based regenerative therapies regarding worldwide equity. 
Indeed, they counterbalance commercial incentives to invest in expensive therapies to treat 
chronic illnesses in the Western world while low priority is given to common/acute conditions 
in the developing world and to the looming global crisis of bacterial resistance to antibiotics. 
As for ChondroCelect in the UK, it raises again the question of equity and a “two- speeds” 
access to innovative drugs if they are reimbursed by private insurances only. Contrary to 
France which is setting- up a general framework for the medico- economic evaluation of 
health product, the thinking is ongoing in England regarding the adequacy of the current 
national framework for the efficiency assessment of cell- based regenerative therapies. This is 
notably due to the national strategy on regenerative medicine and to the establishment of the 
RMEG. Moreover, a UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funded project, 
REGenableMED, aims to examine the dynamics of innovation within the field of regenerative 
medicine. It is undertaking a detailed analysis of the interplay between business models, 
measures of clinical utility, patterns of regulatory oversight and clinical workflows within 
healthcare settings, and specifically considers the reimbursement and the adoption in clinics 
issues for regenerative medicine.133 The presence of such project’s funding contributes to 
prove the means that are provided for the promotion of regenerative medicine in the UK and 
the political interest it raises.  
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